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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a priority claim for reimbursement by the Department of 
Health and Welfare (Department), from a recipient of medical assistance (Medicaid) from 
that portion of his settlement subject to a lien under federal and state Medicaid laws. The 
issue is identical to that presented in Supreme Court Docket #34495. The Argument 
found herein is virtually identical to that found in the above docket number. The 
Standard of Review is the most recent standard mentioned by the Court. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
On June 17, 2004, Matey's son (Jess Matey) was involved in a motor vehicle 
collision in which he sustained a traumatic brain injury (TBI). (R. pgs.5-6). He is 
eligible for benefits under the Social Security Act for supplemental security income and 
for Medicaid under state and federal law. (R. pg. 6). Jess began receiving Medicaid 
benefits on June 17, 2004, and had received approximately $60,774.56 in Medicaid 
Benefits as of the date of the Petition to Settle Underinsured Motor Vehicle Claim of 
Incapacitated Person and Approve Payment to Special Needs Trust (Hereinafter Petition 
to Approve Trust). Matey does not dispute this figure. (R. pg. 38). 
At the time of the collision, the Mateys were insured with State Farm with an 
underlying policy with underinsured motor vehicle coverage limits of $250,000 and an 
umbrella policy that provided an additional $1,000,000.00 in underinsured motor vehicle 
coverage. (R. pg. 6). ARer some time, State Farm offered, under certain conditions, to 
pay to the Mateys the sum of $1,250,000.00. (R. pg. 6). On June 29, 2006, the Mateys 
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petitioned the court to approve a special needs trust pursuant to Idaho Code 68-1405 
without reimbursing Medicaid for the amount expended. (R. pg. 6). 
C. Statement of the Proceeding. 
On or about June 29, 2006, Respondents' Chris J. Matey and Pam S. Matey 
(bereinafter referred to as "Matey") filed a PETITION TO SETTLE UNDERINSURED 
MOTOR VEHICLE CLAIM OF INCAPACITATED PERSON AND APPROVE 
PAYMENT TO SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST (Petition). The Idaho Department of Health 
and Welfare filed an objection, titled OBJECTION TO PETITION TO SETTLE AND 
APPROVE TRUST, on July 19, 2006, asserting that no settlement funds should be paid 
to the special needs trust until the Department's Medicaid statutory lien, in the amount of 
$76,757.70 was satisfied as required by Idaho Code § 68-1405(4). A hearing by 
telephone was held on July 25,2006, on Matey's MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DEPOSIT 
FUNDS WITH THE COURT AND TO CONDUCT BIFURCATED PROCEEDING ON 
THE PETITION TO SETTLE UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE CLAIM. The 
Motion was denied. On September 26, 2006, a hearing was held before the Magistrate, 
and on October 10,2006, a SECOND MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER was 
issued granting Matey's request to settle the claim and pay to the Department the sum of 
$3,818.26 minus Medicaid's share of attorney fees. This amount was increased by the 
Order issued on November 2, 2006, to the amount of $4,817.88 (.305% of the amount 
paid by Medicaid), minus attorney fees in the amount of $282.58. A timely appeal was 
taken to the district court which affirmed the magistrate's decision. It is from this 
decision that the Department appeals. 
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11. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the court erred in prohibiting the Department from recovering medical 
expenses paid by Medicaid from that part of a settlement that represents, or can 
reasonably be construed as representing, medical expenses. 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
The Supreme Court has recently altered the standard by which it reviews a decision 
of the district court acting in its appellate capacity. Rather than directly reviewing the 
magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's 
decision, the Supreme Court instead directly reviews the district court's decision. Losser v. 
Bradstreet, - P.3d, 2008 WL 820025 (Idaho) (March 28, 2008). The Court examines 
the magistrate's record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to 
support the magistrate's fmdings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law 
follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
thereeom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, The Supreme Court will 
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id.; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 
Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981). 
The issue presented in this case is an issue of law and involves the interpretation 
of Medicaid law and other relevant statutes. The interpretation of statutes is an issue of 
law over which the court exercises free review. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 81 
P.3d 1236, 1238 (2003); Driver v. SI Corn., 139 Idaho 423, 80 P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003). 
State ex rel. Industrial Com'n v. Bible Missionarv Church, Inc., 138 Idaho 847, 849, 70 
P.3d 685,687 (2003). 
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B. Acceptance of Medicaid Benefits Requires Reimbursement. 
Medicaid is a joint state-federal program to provide medical care to those who are 
unable to provide for themselves. As a condition of eligibility, Medicaid recipients must 
assign to the State any rights they may have to seek payment from any third party up to 
the amount of medical assistance paid. See 42 U.S.C. 8 1396k(a)(l)(A); 42 C.F.R. 
$433.146(c). Medicaid recipients must cooperate with the state agency by identifying 
potentially liable third parties and by providing information to enable the agency to 
pursue them. See 42 C.F.R. 8 433.145(a)(2); 42 C.F.R. 5 433.147(a)(2), (b)(5); 42 
C.F.R. Ej 433.148(a)(2). Recipients must also take reasonable measures, on their own 
behalf, to obtain payment of medical expenses. See 42 U.S.C. $ 1396k(a)(l)(B)(i); 42 
C.F.R. Ej 433.145(a)(2), 42 C.F.R. $ 433.147@)(5). An individual's failure to meet any 
of these obligations imperils his or her eligibility for benefits under the statute. 
To enable the Department to pursue repayment from responsible third parties, the 
Idaho Legislature has enacted Idaho Code Ej 56-209b. An Idaho Medicaid recipient, or 
his representative, at the time of application and as a condition of eligibility, must assign 
to the Department his rights to any payment from a third party, including, but not limited 
to a tortfeasor, for care or other medical benefits. See Idaho Code 5 56-209b(4). Under 
Idaho Code Ej 56-209b(5) the Department "shall have priority to any amount received 
from a third party or entity which can reasonably be consbued to compensate the 
recipient for the occurrence giving rise to the need for medical assistance whether the 
settlement or judgment is obtained through the subrogation right of the department or 
through recovery by the recipient, and whether the recipient is made whole by the amount 
recovered." The statute goes on to state specifically that the "...department will be 
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entitled to reimbursement of medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of the recipient 
arising from the incident or occurrence & to any amount being distributed to the 
recipient." [Emphasis added.] 
Thus, the statutory authority for the recovery of Medicaid benefits allows for a 
priority claim by the Department for the recovery of Medicaid benefits provided to an 
individual while his tort claim is proceeding, and reimbursement must be made by the 
tortfeasor to Medicaid prior to disbursement to the recipient. 
C. A Supplemental Needs Trust Requires Reimbursement of Medicaid Prior to 
its Creation. 
Under ordinary circumstances, an individual is not eligible for Medicaid benefits 
if he has resources exceeding $2,000.00. This requirement is consistent with the 
philosophy that Medicaid is the "payor of last resort," and continues to be a requirement 
each month the recipient receives benefits. If the individual's resources exceed the 
$2,000.00 limit in one month, heishe does not receive benefits the following month and 
must re-qualify for Wher  assistance. 
Federal law permits the creation of a special needs trust for the benefit of 
permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65, if the State will receive all amounts 
remaining in the trust upon the death of the Medicaid recipient. (42 U.S.C. 
5 1396p(d)(4)(A)). Assets placed in a special needs trust (S.N.T.) may only be used to 
meet the needs of the beneficiary that are not covered by Medicaid. The assets of a 
qualifying S.N.T. are not counted in determining Medicaid eligibility. Nothing in the 
federal law authorizing S.N.T.'s alters the requirement that Medicaid recipients assign to 
the State their right to payment for medical care from any third party, including, but not 
limited to, payments arising out of personal injury lawsuits. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1396k. 
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Idaho law places restrictions on the creation of special needs trusts. Idaho Code 
5 68-1405(4) requires that " ... a court order for payment of money ... to a special needs trust 
shall include a provision that all statutory liens ... in favor of the Idaho deparknent of 
health and welfare ... shall be satisfied first." 
Idaho Code 5 56-209b(6) provides, in part, as follows: 
If a settlement or judgment is received by the recipient without delineating 
what portion of the settlement or judgment is in payment of medical 
expenses, it will be presumed that the settlement or iudgment amlies first 
to the medical expenses incurred by the recipient in an amount equal to the 
expenditure for medical assistance benefits paid by the department as a 
result of the occurrence giving rise to the payment or payments to the 
recipient. 
Idaho Code $56-209b(6). (Emphasis added). 
D. Ahlborn Requires Reimbursement of Medicaid Benefits Allocated to Medical 
Expense by the Settlement. 
A recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Arkansas Department of Health and Human 
Services v. Ahlbom, 126 S.Ct 1752 (2006), has caused confusion among those who are 
not familiar with Medicaid. In that decision, the Supreme Court held that a State's 
reimbursement for Medicaid expenditures could only be made against those recoveries 
intended to compensate an accident victim for resulting medical expenses. Historically, 
Medicaid took its reimbursement from the entire settlement monies, even if that meant 
the recipient was left with nothing. It was a position forced on the various States by the 
federal govemment through its regulatory agency, and lei? the various state Medicaid 
agencies with little or no authority to "negotiate" a claim for reimbursement. Ahlbom at 
1766. 
In ARlborn, the Supreme Court decided that those regulations were in conflict 
with the federal Medicaid statutes. It said that if a portion of the settlement is 
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specifically allocated to non-medical expenses such as pain and suffering, and/or loss of 
consortium, that amount could not be subject to Medicaid's lien; Medicaid agencies can 
only recover expenses from that portion of the settlement that is meant to reimburse the 
Medicaid recipient for medical expenses, not for other damages. Ahlborn at 1761. 
However, once that decision regarding the amount of the settlement that is 
allocated, or should be allocated, to medical expenses is made the process by which that 
portion of the recovery is disbursed is a question of state law. Ahlbom at 1765. 
Idaho has such a process in place to provide guidance in the proper distribution of 
the monies allocated by Matey. Idaho Code fi 56-209b, Idaho Code fi 68-1405 and 
Davis v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 130 Idaho 469, 943 P.2d 59 (1997), 
provide the framework suggested by Ahlborn at 1765 FN 17. 
This case can and should be resolved using these tools and no others. 
The confusion regarding Ahlborn has arisen because of the unique way in which 
the question was presented to the court and the application of Arkansas law. 
Much like here, Ahlbom involved the victim of an automobile accident. In that 
case, Arkansas provided Medicaid assistance in the amount of more than $215,645.30 for 
medical care arising from the injuries sustained in the accident. The Medicaid recipient, 
without the prior knowledge of the state agency, settled the tort action arising out of the 
accident for $550,000. Her complaint against the alleged tortfeasor had claimed damages 
of over $3 million. The settlement did not contain an allocation of damages between 
medical costs and other damages, such as lost or impaired earnings and pain and 
suffering. Following the longstanding interpretation of the federal Medicaid agency, 
Arkansas insisted it had a lien upon, and the right to be reimbursed from the entire 
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settlement, without regard to how the damages might be allocated between medical and 
other costs. Perhaps because Arkansas was so certain of its position, it stipulated that, in 
that particular case, the medical damages were only one sixth of the total settlement. 
This was, apparently, calculated as the total amount of damages alleged divided by the 
ultimate settlement amount. In other words, since the Medicaid recipient recovered one 
sixth of the total amount of alleged damages, the Medicaid recovery amount would be 
one sixth of the total amount of Medicaid payments made. There was no Arkansas 
statute or rule of law that informed this stipulation; rather, it was merely a concession to 
simplify presentation of the issue to the court: whether Arkansas' claim was against the 
entire settlement or only a portion of that settlement allocated to medical expenses. 
The Supreme Court first held that the assignment provisions of federal Medicaid 
law--requiring states to enact laws providing for assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries' 
rights to seek and collect payment for medical care from a responsible third party--only 
provide for a limited assignment fiom the recipient to the state for payment for medical 
items and services &om a liable third party. Ahlborn concluded that statutes (or federal 
agency guidelines) providing for an assignment or lien against the non-medical portion of 
a tort recovery would be inconsistent with the Medicaid "anti-lien" statute, 42 U.S.C. 
5 139613, which prohibits states from placing liens against or seeking recovery of benefits 
from a Medicaid beneficiary before her death. Ahlborn at 1755. According to the 
Court, while the assignment provisions create an exception to the anti-lien statute for 
recovery of payments that constitute reimbursement for medical costs, a recovery of 
settlement funds intended to reimburse the Medicaid beneficiary for pain and suffering, 
Appellant's Brief - 8. 
lost wages, or other non-medical damages would constitute an impermissible lien on the 
beneficiary's property. Ahlborn at 1762. 
The Supreme Court's decision is straightforward. However, confusion has arisen 
because of the stipulation in Ahlborn which was not required or approved by the Supreme 
Court and was not any part of the Supreme Court's ruling. In our case, the Magistrate 
seems to have concluded that since, in Ahlborn, Arkansas stipulated that it could be 
reimbursed for only that proportion of Medicaid expenses in relationship to 
damages, that Idaho too must be limited to that proportion of Medicaid expenses to the 
total alleged damages in this case. In other words, the Magistrate imposed Arkansas' 
stipulation in Ahlborn, on the State of Idaho. Under this rationale, the higher and 
however unrealistic the allegation of damages in the complaint, the smaller would be the 
relative Medicaid recovery. This is simply wrong, and not allowed by law. 
Even if Matey could unilaterally allocate the damages in this case, as the 
Magistrate allowed, but Ahlborn disapproves,' the Department would $iJ be allowed 
reimbursement of its entire amount expended for Matey's medical care in this case. 
The Matey allocation (R pg.56) was as follows: 
i Allocation agreements simply between plaintiff's counsel and the alleged tortfeasor's counsel 
will likely not be sufficient and might very well run afoul of "the risk that parties to a tort suit will 
allocate away the State's interest.. ." at 1765; J. Mark Coulson, Supreme Court Re- 
defines Personal Injury Playing Field, 40-FEB Md. B.J. 58. 
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According to Ahlborn, the Department's statutory lien does not apply to those 
Type of Damage 
Past Medical expenses (Medicaid) 
Medical expenses (Other) 
Miscellaneous Expenses* 
Lost Earnings * (Past) 
Lost Earnings * (Future) 
Lost Household Services 
Future Medical Expenses 
Non Economic Damages * 
damages marked with an asterisk. Ahlborn at 1762. However, it does apply to those that 









are unmarked. Therefore, the funds available for satisfaction of the Department's lien 
under the holding of Ahlborn, and subject to the Department's statutory lien, are as 
follows: 
Permissible "lien" pursuant to Ahlborn. 1 $1,049,268.00 
Type of Damage 
Past Medical expenses (Medicaid) 
Medical expenses (Other) 
Future Medical Expenses 
The pertinent language of Ahlborn requires this result: 




...[ w]e must decide whether ADHS can lay claim to more than the 
portion of Ahlborn settlement that represents medical expenses. 
Ahlborn at 1760. 
Accordingly, what 42 U.S.C. § 1396k@) requires is that the State 
be paid first out of any damages representing payments for medical care 
before the recipient can recover any of her own costs for medical care. 
Ahlborn at 1762. 
But that provision 142 U.S.C. $ 1396k@)] does not authorize the 
State to demand reimbursement from portions of the settlement allocated 
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or allocable to nonmedical damages; instead, it gives the State a priority 
disbursement from the medical expenses portion alone. See supra, at 
1762. 
Ahlborn at 1767. 
Because the amount allocated to medical expenses exceeds the amount Medicaid 
has expended in the past for Matey, the Department must be reimbursed for all of the 
Medicaid benefits paid. 
Only if the amount permitted by Ahlborn were less than the amount expended by 
Medicaid (as of the date of creation of the special needs trust), would the Department 
receive less that expended, but it would receive all the monies allocated to medical 
expenses. 
Absent a stipulation, a reduction of the past medical expenses, in any situation 
seems inappropriate. Matey would not be able to go back to his medical providers and 
offer them, or force them to accept .03% of the bill for their services simply because the 
plaintiffs chose to settle for an amount less than his actual damages. Medicaid paid those 
providers according to its agreement with them. Matey now needs to reimburse Medicaid 
according to his agreement. See Davis v. Idaho Devt of Health and Welfare, 130 Idaho 
469, at 472. 
The interpretation of Ahlborn proposed by Matey, and accepted by the lower 
court is not reasonable. Congress and the Idaho Legislature could not intend such a 
construction of a federal and state statute. A statute designed to reimburse federal and 
state public assistance law should not be construed to allow only 3 cents on every ten 
dollars expended as reimbursement. 
The objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted it. Pa~ette River Prov. Owners Ass'n, 132 Idaho 557, 976 
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P.2d 483 (1999). Such analysis begins with the literal language of the enactment. Id. 
Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body 
must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory 
construction. Id. An ordinance is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be 
uncertain as to its meaning. Id. However, ambiguity is not present merely because the 
parties present differing interpretations to the court. Id. Constructions that would lead to 
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Id. "Language of a particular 
section need not be viewed in a vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be 
construed together so as to determine the legislature's intent." Friends of Farm to Market 
Rd 137 Idaho 197,46 P.3d 14 (2002). d, 
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Ahlbom, the intent of the legislature was to 
provide reimbursement only from that portion of the settlement that represented medical 
expenses. It did not further reduce the amount available for reimbursement. Ahlborn at 
1760. 
Respondent's unreasonable construction does nothing but create a breach between 
the Medicaid recipient and Medicaid by insisting that the more damages the recipient can 
allege, the smaller the amount available to reimburse Medicaid. Here, Matey insists that 
if he alleges $26 million in damages he can, and in fact does, dwarf or eliminate his 
Medicaid debt. 
Under Idaho Code § 56-209b(5) the Department 
... shall have priority to any amount received from a third party or entity which 
can reasonably be construed to compensate the recipient for the occurrence giving rise to 
the need for medical assistance whether the settlement or judgment is obtained through 
the subrogation right of the department or through recovery by the recipient, and whether 
the recipient is made whole by the amount recovered. 
The statute goes on to state specifically that the 
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... department will be entitled to reimbursement of medical 
assistance benefits paid on behalf of the recipient arising from the incident 
or occurrence a to any amount being distributed to the recipient. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The Supreme Court specifically approved of this process: what 42 U.S.C. 
5 1396k(b) requires is that the State be paid first out of any damages representing 
payments for medical care before the recipient can recover any of her own costs for 
medical care." Ahlborn at 1762. 
Idaho Code 5 56-209b(5) constitutes the "special rule" as contemplated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, suggested by footnote 17 of the decision in Ahlborn which should 
be employed by this Court to meet "concerns about settlement manipulation." AhIborn at 
1765. 
No federal court decision has been reached defining the specific ramifications of 
Ahlborn on Medicaid cases as of this writing. Most Courts, and the federal courts in 
particular are finding ways to distinguish Ahlborn. Cf. Estate of Ramirez, 14 Misc.3d 
480, 826 N.Y.S.2d. 553, (2006) (Held that Estate Recovery is not affected by the 
limitations of Ahlborn) and Wal-Mart v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834 (2007). (ERISA is not 
affected by Ahlborn. Federal courts can't change federal statutes which are clear and 
unambiguous). 
The Court held that neither the "make whole" or the "pro rata" approach was 
appropriate relief within the meaning of ERISA. - at 839. 
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Unlike Ahlborn, Shank was decided strictly on contract law and the Court held 
that "the Plan" was not limited in its reimbursement to only that portion of a judgment or 
settlement that covered medical expenses. Shank at 839.2 
The court also said that Ahlborn does not support the extension of its 
holding to an ERISA action. 
The Supreme court there addressed a state law that required Medicaid recipients 
who obtains a judgment or settlement against a third party to reimburse the State for all 
payments made on their behalf. The Court concluded that the state reimbursement 
statute "squarely conflict with the ... federal Medicaid laws," which entitled a State only 
that portion of a judgment or settlement that covered medical expenses. Ahlborn at 1760, 
1761-1763, -k at 839. 
Until Ahlborn, all Medicaid recoveries were analyzed with an awareness of 
contract law. The Medicaid recipient agreed, prior to accepting benefits, to the same 
terms as those in the Wal-Mart Plan. 
An argument has been made that the State's interpretation of Ahlborn would 
discourage Medicaid recipients from taking action against the alleged tortfeasor because 
the recipient would make no recoveries. Respondents will argue that the recipient would 
take nothing because they have to repay the loan from Medicaid. It is not accurate. The 
Medicaid recipient should not have all of his medical expenses paid by Medicaid and 
then recover the same amount from the tortfeasor. A Medicaid recipient receives a pro 
rata share of the attorney fees incurred in his suit and he does not pay more than the 
medical expenses portion of the settlement or judgment, even if this is less than his debt 
to Medicaid. 
"Health plans are increasingly adopting language such as Wal-Mart's which 
dictate that it is to be paid first out of any settlement, regardless of what remains for the 
2 The Supreme Court did not need to reach this issue in a because its holding is so specific: 
Medicaid reimbursement comes out of damages representing medical expenses. 
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injured person. Moreover, the victim is responsible for all legal costs in pursuing the 
suit." Vanessa Fuhrmans, Accident Victim Face Grab for Legal Winnings, Wall Street 
Journal, November 20,2007. State and federal law has always been more reasonable. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Federal law prohibits the department from reimbursement from that portion of the 
judgment or settlement that represents pain and suffering and other non-medical 
expenses. If that part of the settlement is adequate, reimbursement of the entire amount 
representing the Medicaid expenses already paid for Matey is warranted because the law 
and public policy provide a mechanism to enable public welfare agencies to recoup some 
portion of their outlays, when possible, in order to ensure that the less fortunate can in the 
future have access to medical care that they cannot otherwise afford. 
* .. 
Respectfully submitted this- day of May, 2008. 
Appellant's Brief - 15. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing APPEAL BRIEF was mailed first class, postage prepaid, in the U.S. Mail, to 
the following: 
ROBYN M. BRODY 
HEPWORTH LEZAMIZ & JANIS CHTD 
133 SHOSHONE STREET NORTH 
PO BOX 389 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303 
Appellant's Brief - 16. 
